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PIN THE TAIL ON THE DONKEY: BENEFICIARY ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE MEDICAID ACT OVER TIME 
JANE PERKINS* 
ABSTRACT 
During the twentieth century, Congress enacted legislation designed to 
improve the lives of low-income Americans. A number of these laws were 
enacted by Congress pursuant to the Constitution’s Spending Clause, 
including the Medicaid Act, which entitles certain low-income individuals to 
publicly funded health insurance coverage. As enacted in 1965, the Medicaid 
Act did not include a provision authorizing the statute’s beneficiaries to bring 
private enforcement actions in court. Since the early 1970s, however, program 
beneficiaries relied upon the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause or, more 
frequently, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the cause of action allowing them to obtain 
relief in court. More recently, the Supreme Court has restricted private 
enforcement of Spending Clause enactments. This article discusses the judicial 
and legislative actions affecting private enforcement under the Supremacy 
Clause and Section 1983. It then reviews Medicaid’s enforcement track record 
in the federal courts of appeals in light of these Supreme Court and 
congressional activities. Congress intends for program beneficiaries to be able 
to enforce provisions of the Medicaid Act, and, applying the Supreme Court’s 
traditional enforcement test under Section 1983, the appellate courts are 
consistently allowing certain Medicaid provisions to be enforced by program 
beneficiaries while refusing to allow enforcement of others. 
  
 
* Jane Perkins, J.D., M.P.H. Legal Director, National Health Law Program. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The nation’s founders relied on English laws and principles, among them 
the “invariable principle . . . that every right, when withheld, must have a 
remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”1 The Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision, Marbury v. Madison, reflects this notion, stating that “[t]he very 
essence of civil liberty . . . [is] the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties 
of government is to afford that protection.”2 
During the twentieth century, Congress enacted legislation designed to 
improve living conditions for lower-income Americans. A number of these 
laws were enacted by Congress under the Spending Clause.3 The Social 
Security Act, of which Medicaid is a part, is an example of a Spending Clause 
enactment.4 Like many Spending Clause enactments, the Medicaid Act makes 
federal funding available to states that implement Medicaid consistent with the 
requirements of the federal law and authorizes the federal government to 
withhold or terminate federal funding to a state that is not operating according 
to federal requirements.5 States are not required to participate in Medicaid, but 
all do.6 
Notably, enacting Congresses did not include provisions in these laws that 
authorize the statute’s beneficiaries to bring private enforcement actions when 
they are being harmed by violations of the law. That is not surprising. These 
Congresses were acting pursuant to a rights-remedy presumption, with the 
understanding that courts would “provide such remedies as are necessary to 
make effective the congressional purpose.”7 Program beneficiaries have relied 
upon the Supremacy Clause or, more frequently, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the 
cause of action that allows them to go to court.8 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has turned away from the remedial 
imperative, particularly with respect to private enforcement of Spending 
Clause enactments. This article discusses the Court’s opinions affecting private 
enforcement of the Medicaid Act and describes Congress’s response to the 
Court with respect to the Social Security Act. It then reviews Medicaid’s 
enforcement track record in the courts of appeals in light of these Supreme 
 
 1. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109. 
 2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b, 1396c (2012). 
 6. Medicaid, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/re 
search/health/medicaid-home-page.aspx. 
 7. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). But cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (stating that understanding has been abandoned). 
 8. See Jane Perkins, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Federal Laws, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 720, 721, 727 (Mar.-Apr. 2005). 
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Court and congressional activities. Congress intends for program beneficiaries 
to be able to enforce provisions of the Social Security Act, and, applying the 
Supreme Court’s traditional enforcement test, the courts of appeals are 
consistently allowing certain Medicaid provisions to be enforced by program 
beneficiaries while refusing to allow enforcement of others. 
II.  ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE 
Under the Supremacy Clause, the laws of the United States “shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”9 “The underlying rationale [for this] 
pre-emption doctrine as stated more than a century and a half ago, is that the 
Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that ‘interfere with or are contrary to, 
the laws of congress.’”10 
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that it was 
“beyond dispute” that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear claims for 
injunctive relief asserting that a state law is preempted by a federal statute that 
does not provide an express cause of action: 
A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that 
such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal 
question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to 
resolve . . . This Court, of course, frequently has resolved pre-emption disputes 
in a similar jurisdictional posture.11 
The Court resolved Shaw on the merits, holding that the state law was 
preempted insofar as it prohibited practices that were permitted under federal 
law.12 Indeed, over the years corporations and private individuals enforced the 
Supremacy Clause in hundreds of cases. And on numerous occasions dating 
from the early 1970s, the Supreme Court recognized that Social Security Act 
beneficiaries could bring preemption actions to enjoin state laws that conflict 
with federal law and were, thus, “invalid under the Supremacy Clause.”13 
Under these precedents, the federal courts of appeals recognized that the 
Medicaid Act is “supreme” federal law and on this basis invalidated conflicting 
 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 10. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (quoting 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)). 
 11. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983). 
 12. Id. at 108-09. 
 13. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285 (1971) (recognizing that Social 
Security Act beneficiaries can bring preemption actions to enjoin state laws that conflict with 
federal law and are, thus, “invalid under the Supremacy Clause”); Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 
1391, 1398 (2013) (finding state law ran afoul of the Supremacy Clause because it conflicted with 
the Medicaid Act and was “pre-empted for that reason”); Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397 
(1988); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 138 (1982). 
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state law.14 For example, in Lankford v. Sherman, Medicaid beneficiaries 
challenged a state law that eliminated Medicaid coverage of medically 
necessary medical equipment and supplies for individuals with disabilities 
other than blindness.15 The court accepted the plaintiffs’ Supremacy Clause 
claim, explaining that the Supremacy Clause “concerns the federal structure of 
the Nation.”16 Citing Supreme Court cases that concerned Supremacy Clause 
actions by corporations, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “[w]hile Medicaid is 
a system of cooperative federalism, the same analysis applies; once the state 
voluntarily accepts the conditions imposed by Congress, the Supremacy Clause 
obliges it to comply with federal requirements.”17 
Four years ago, however, the Supreme Court openly questioned this type 
of private enforcement when it accepted certiorari in Douglas v. Independent 
Living Center of Southern California, Inc.18 The question before the Court was 
“[w]hether Medicaid . . . [providers could] maintain a cause of action under the 
Supremacy Clause to enforce” the Medicaid Act’s equal access provision, 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), “by asserting that the provision preempts a state law 
reducing reimbursement rates.”19 The Court ultimately refused to decide the 
Supremacy Clause question after the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) expressly approved the state’s position in the underlying 
substantive dispute.20 However, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a strongly worded 
dissent arguing against the providers’ Supremacy Clause enforcement.21 
 
 14. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 85 (1st Cir. 
2001); Concourse Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Whalen, 249 F.3d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich. v. Engler, 73 F.3d 634, 639 (6th Cir. 1996); Hern v. Beye, 
57 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 1995); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 
170, 185 (3d Cir. 1995); Hope Med. Grp. for Women v. Edwards, 63 F.3d 418, 428 (5th Cir. 
1995); Lewis v. Hegstrom, 767 F.2d 1371, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1985); Randall v. Lukard, 709 F.2d 
257, 264 (4th Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 728 F.2d 966, 967 (4th Cir. 1984); Hodgson v. 
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 614 F.2d 601, 615 (8th Cir. 1980); Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196, 202-03 
(7th Cir. 1979). 
 15. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 506 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing the Medicaid 
reasonable standards provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2006)). 
 16. Id. at 509 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 108 (1989) 
distinguishing enforcement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which involves “the securing of rights, 
privileges and immunities [established by Congress] to individuals”). 
 17. Lankford, 451 F.3d at 510. 
 18. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207 (2012). 
 19.  Id. at 1212. 
 20. Id. at 1211 (remanding to determine whether CMS’s action was entitled to deference or 
whether it was arbitrary under the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 21. Id. at 1214 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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A. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center 
In the 2014-2015 Term, the Court answered the question raised in Douglas 
when it decided Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center.22 In 2009, the 
Exceptional Child Center and other in-home habilitation services providers 
sued Idaho Medicaid Director Richard Armstrong on the grounds that they 
were not being paid enough.23 According to the record, the state set the 
providers’ rates based on how much it wanted to spend on the Medicaid 
program rather than on how much habilitation services actually cost.24 The 
providers wanted the Medicaid agency to establish rates according to the 
Medicaid Act’s equal access provision, which requires states to set Medicaid 
payments at a level “sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and 
services are available under the [Medicaid] plan at least to the extent that such 
care and services are available to the general population in the geographic 
area.”25 The lower courts found an implied cause of action under the 
Supremacy Clause to enforce the provision and that the provision was being 
violated by the State.26 
On March 31, 2015, the Supreme Court reversed and held that health care 
providers cannot enforce the Supremacy Clause to make a state comply with 
the Medicaid equal access provision, nor can they rely on courts, sitting in 
equity, to enjoin state laws that are inconsistent with the provision.27 It comes 
as no surprise that the case was a close call—a five to four decision.28 The 
line-up of the justices did not reflect the usual ideological split, however. 
Justice Breyer voted with the majority; Justice Kennedy, with the dissent.29 
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion. As noted above, these types of 
cases have been filed for hundreds of years and, with respect to the Social 
Security Act, since at least the 1970s. While acknowledging this “long-
established practice,” Justice Scalia said that it “does not justify a rule that 
denies [the] . . . fairest reading.”30 And according to this reading, the health 
care providers did not have an implied cause of action under the Supremacy 
Clause because that provision creates a “rule of decision” that merely 
“instructs courts what to do when state and federal law clash, but is silent 
regarding who may enforce federal laws in court, and in what circumstances 
 
 22. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1387-88 (2015). 
 23. Id. at 1382; Inclusion, Inc. v. Armstrong, 835 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961-63 (D. Idaho 2011), 
aff’d, 567 Fed. App’x 496, 497 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 24. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1382. 
 25. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2012). 
 26. See Inclusion, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 2d at 964. 
 27. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1387-88. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at 1388, 1390. 
 30. Id. at 1382. 
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they may do so.”31 The dissenting justices, led by Justice Sotomayor, did not 
dispute this part of the majority opinion.32 
The Court also unanimously agreed that a plaintiff might still be able to 
obtain equitable relief: “The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by 
state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long 
history of judicial review of illegal executive action . . . It is a judge-made 
remedy.”33 Thus, the Court considered whether the plaintiffs could bring their 
suit against the Idaho Medicaid officials in equity and, for this, they looked for 
congressional intent—whether Congress intended to allow courts in equity to 
hear such actions: “[t]he power of federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful 
executive action is subject to express and implied statutory limitations.”34 
The Armstrong majority held “the Medicaid Act implicitly precludes 
private enforcement of § (30)(A) [the equal access provision],” so the health 
care providers could not invoke the court’s equitable powers to “circumvent 
Congress’s exclusion of private enforcement.”35 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court relied on two indications of congressional intent. First, the “sole 
remedy” Congress provided in the Medicaid Act authorizes the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to terminate or withhold 
federal funding to all or parts of the state Medicaid program until the state 
stops violating the federal law.36 The majority found that the “express 
provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress 
intended to preclude others.”37 
There are a couple of problems with this reading. First, determination of 
whether there is a private cause of action is supposed to rest upon 
congressional intent. As explained above, when Congress enacted Medicaid, it 
was working under long-standing court precedent recognizing the right of 
individuals to claim protection of the law and the duty of courts to accord an 
appropriate remedy in the absence of any express statutory authorization of a 
 
 31. Id. at 1383 (citations omitted). 
 32. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 1384 (citation omitted); see id. at 1390 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), as “[p]erhaps the most famous exposition of this principle”). 
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions explain the basis for the cause of action. 
 34. Id. at 1385. 
 35. Id. In Part IV of the opinion (not joined by Justice Breyer and, thus, without majority 
status), Justice Scalia and three other justices expressed doubt that health care providers can ever 
enforce the Medicaid Act. Id. at 1387 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 
U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). The justices stated, “We doubt . . . that providers are intended beneficiaries (as 
opposed to mere incidental beneficiaries) of the Medicaid agreement, which was concluded for 
the benefit of the infirm whom the providers were to serve, rather than for the benefit of the 
providers themselves.” Id. 
 36. Id. at 1385 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012)). 
 37. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 
(2001)). 
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federal cause of action. So, the enacting Congress would not have thought it 
necessary to insert provisions about private enforcement. Second, a statutory 
enforcement scheme either substitutes for private enforcement or it does not. In 
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, the Court had already held in the 
Section 1983 context that the Medicaid Act does not contain a statutory 
scheme that would foreclose private enforcement.38 
Armstrong’s second major point is that, while the termination of funding 
provision might not, by itself, preclude the providers’ lawsuit, the Medicaid 
equal access provision does because it is so broad and non-specific as to be 
“judicially unadministrable.”39 But this rationale also is problematic. The 
Medicaid equal access provision does require significant evidentiary proof, but 
it was certainly not beyond the competency of previous courts to administer. 
Indeed, prior to this opinion, courts had enforced the equal access provision 
dozens of times.40 
Nevertheless, according to the Armstrong majority, the providers’ remedy 
is to compel the Secretary of HHS to take action against the state.41 As noted, 
the action that the Medicaid Act authorizes the Secretary to take is the 
termination of all or part of the state’s federal Medicaid funding.42 In other 
words, the Court is saying that health care providers, who are not being paid 
enough by the state Medicaid agency, can ask the federal government to deny 
the state the federal funding that the state needs to operate its Medicaid 
program.43 That does not seem fair; in fact, it seems nonsensical that Congress 
would have ever expected a health care provider to seek such a remedy. 
Indeed, former HHS officials submitted a brief to the Supreme Court in this 
case stating: 
Every aspect of [HHS’s] administration of the Medicaid program—from its 
regulations to its annual budget—is premised on the understanding that private 
parties will shoulder much of the enforcement burden. CMS [the part of HHS 
in charge of Medicaid] lacks the logistical and financial resources necessary to 
be the exclusive enforcer of the equal access mandate, and it is highly unlikely 
to receive the necessary resources in the future.44 
 
 38. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 522 (1990). 
 39. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385. 
 40. See, e.g., NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, THE ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAID 
PROGRAM 4.15, 4.77-.78 & 45 n.244 (May 2011 & Oct. 2012 Supp.) (providing a string citation 
of cases). 
 41. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1387. 
 42. Id. at 1385-87. 
 43. Id. at 1387. 
 44. Brief for Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, 
Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. 1378 (No. 14-15). 
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B. The Emerging Post-Armstrong Landscape 
Both federal and state government defendants are seeking to expand 
Armstrong. In Georgia Department of Community Health v. United States, 
Georgia Medicaid filed suit against the United States after forty-five million 
dollars was mistakenly credited to CMS rather than Georgia.45 The federal 
government argues that Armstrong prohibits the court from providing equitable 
relief and that the state’s sole remedy is an appeal to the HHS Department 
Appeals Board, followed by judicial review of that decision.46 The district 
court rejected the argument on grounds that the Georgia agency is neither 
relying on the Supremacy Clause to establish an implied cause of action nor 
asking the court to enjoin a federal statute.47 The ruling has been appealed.48 
The federal government also raised Armstrong in United States House of 
Representatives v. Burwell; however, the district court found Armstrong is “of 
no concern” and that the House has an implied cause of action under the 
Constitution’s appropriations provision to complain that Obama administration 
officials spent billions of unappropriated dollars to support implementation of 
the Affordable Care Act.49 
State defendants are also citing Armstrong to support dismissal of 
Supremacy Clause claims and in arguments to extend Armstrong to claims 
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.50 Section 1983 developments are discussed in 
the next section. 
Armstrong immediately affected a number of pending California cases that 
relied on the Supremacy Clause to enjoin state Medicaid payment policies. The 
Ninth Circuit reversed its opinion in Armstrong, vacated the district court 
injunction, and ordered the district court to dismiss the complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.51 Another court granted the plaintiff’s request to 
dismiss Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital v. Maxwell-Jolly in light of 
Armstrong.52 The court had denied the plaintiff’s request to dismiss the case 
while Armstrong was pending because there was no clear guidance on the 
Supremacy Clause claim and, thus, concern that the plaintiff was simply trying 
 
 45. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 110 F. Supp. 3d 95, 
96-97 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 46. Defendant’s Reply on Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment at 2, Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. 
Health, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 95 (No. 13-1281). 
 47. See Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 98-99. 
 48. Id. at 98, appeal docketed, No. 15-5236 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2015). 
 49. See House of Representatives v. Burwell et al., No. 14-1967, 2015 WL 5294762, at *21 
(D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2015). 
 50. See infra Section III.B. 
 51. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong, 788 F.3d 991, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 52. See Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp. v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 08-cv-5173 SC, 2015 WL 4451377, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-16650 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015). 
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to avoid the federal courts.53 And when the court did grant the plaintiff’s 
request following Armstrong, it did so over the defendant’s objection that 
dismissal of the complaint would deny the defendant of a favorable federal 
forum for judgment on the merits.54 The defendant’s argument was rejected 
because the court decided that the case had not progressed far enough to 
unduly harm the defendant.55 In yet another California case, the district court 
relied on the doctrine of law of the case and refused to vacate a permanent 
injunction but, following Armstrong, did vacate that portion of the order 
providing that “[t]he State is further enjoined from making any future changes 
to payments [received] by providers without complying that [sic.] the 
requirements of [§ 30(A)] [on a prospective basis] and demonstrating that 
approval has been obtained from the Center for Medicaid Services.”56 
Armstrong has also prevented Medicaid providers and beneficiaries in 
Florida from continuing to pursue a Supremacy Clause claim to enjoin state 
policies that they argue violate Medicaid’s Section (30)(A) requirements.57 A 
New York court dismissed a Supremacy Clause claim brought by Medicaid 
beneficiaries seeking to enjoin state laws that exclude services associated with 
Gender Identity Disorder/Gender Dysphoria on the grounds that the state laws 
are inconsistent with the Medicaid reasonable standards provision, 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(17).58 And two separate cases from New Jersey refused to allow 
Medicaid-participating health care providers and their patients to enforce the 
Supremacy Clause to enjoin state policies that they argued were inconsistent 
with the Medicaid Act.59 One of these cases involved the Medicaid equal 
access requirement.60 The other involved Medicaid’s service comparability, 
reasonable standards, freedom of choice, and Early and Periodic Screening, 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at *2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Arc of Cal. v. Douglas, 11-cv-02545-MCE-CKD, 2015 WL 5147433, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 1, 2015). 
 57. Fla. Pediatric Soc’y v. Dudek, No. 05-23037-CIV-JORDAN/O’SULLIVAN, 2015 BL 
130043, *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2015); see Levin v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 
3:12-cv-0007-JFA, 2015 WL 4545931, at *6, n.12 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) (dismissing claim to 
enforce Section (30)(A) pursuant to Section 1983 stating that plaintiffs’ claim for equitable relief 
could not be used “as a mechanism to circumvent Congress’s exclusion of private enforcement of  
§ (30)(A)” (citing Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1386 (2015))). 
 58. Cruz v. Zucker, No. 14-cv-4456 (JSR), 2015 WL 4548162, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 
2015). But see id. at *3-10 (recognizing plaintiffs’ rights under Section 1983 to enforce Medicaid 
provisions requiring availability of services (Section (a)(10)(A)), comparability of services 
(Section (a)(10)(B)), and child health services (Section (a)(43))). 
 59. Providence Pediatric Med. DayCare, Inc. v. Alaigh, 112 F. Supp. 3d 234, 249 (D.N.J. 
2015); Mercer Co. Children’s Med. Daycare, LLC v. O’Dowd, No. 13-1436, 2015 WL 5335590, 
at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2015). 
 60. Providence, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 251. 
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Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) provisions.61 The opinion looks only at 
whether the Supremacy Clause can provide a cause of action, not whether a 
court sitting in equity can provide injunctive relief under these federal laws.62 
Since Armstrong, some plaintiffs have opted to pursue their Medicaid 
claims in state, rather than federal, court. But this avenue can also be fraught 
with obstacles. For example, the California Civil Procedure Code Section 1085 
authorizes a state court action for a writ of mandate against the state.63 Citing 
this provision, Medi-Cal participating hospitals filed a case in state court to 
require the state Medicaid agency to make adequate payments.64 The state 
defendant removed the case to federal court arguing that the action actually 
arose under the Medicaid equal access provision.65 Even though removal 
statutes are ordinarily strictly construed against removal, the court ruled 
against the plaintiffs.66 According to the court, 
there can be no question that Plaintiffs’ state court complaint raises a number 
of issues of federal law, including the adequacy of Medi-Cal reimbursements 
under Section (30)(A) . . . [E]ven though state law creates [a party’s] causes of 
action, its case might still arise under the laws of the United States if a well-
pleaded complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires 
resolution of a substantial question of federal law.67 
The plaintiffs’ argued that they lacked standing in federal court to bring the 
Section (30)(A) claim in light of Armstrong, and thus the federal court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction and removal was improper.68 The court, however, 
said Armstrong never mentioned standing but rather discussed the failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.69 The court stated: 
It appears that Petitioners are actually arguing that a favorable decision is 
unlikely in light of Armstrong. Redressability [for purposes of standing], 
however, has to do with the likelihood that the injury will be redressed if a 
 
 61. Mercer, 2015 WL 5335590, at *1-2. 
 62. Id. For cases outside of the Medicaid context, see, e.g., All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing, 
LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-CBS, 2016 WL 223815, at *2-3, *7 (D. Colo. Jan. 19, 2016) 
(refusing to exercise equitable power in Controlled Substance Act case); Friends of the E. 
Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton, No. 15-cv-2246(JS)(ARL), 2015 WL 3936346, at 
*9, *18 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2015) (holding Armstrong precludes plaintiffs from filing claims to 
obtain injunctive relief under the Airway Improvement Act and Airport Noise and Capacity Act). 
 63. CAL. CIV. PROC. §1085 (2011). 
 64. Tulare Local Health Care Dist. v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Care Servs., No. 3:15-cv-02711-
SC, 2015 WL 5260437, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015). 
 65. Id. at *1. 
 66. Id. at *2-3. 
 67. Id. at *2 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The complaint also includes equal 
protection claims under the U.S. and state constitutions. Id. at *1. 
 68. Id. at *3. 
 69. Tulare, 2015 WL 5260427, at *3. 
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favorable decision is rendered, not the likelihood that a favorable decision will 
be rendered.70 
In sum, the hospitals are left in federal court—with no viable claim for relief 
under Section (30)(A). Indeed, in an Answer filed with the federal court on 
September 22, 2015, the state defendant argued that the case should be 
dismissed because of the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and lack of standing.71 
III.  ENFORCEMENT UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983 
Title 42, Section 1983 of the U.S. Code provides an express cause of 
action to individuals when a state actor is depriving them of their rights under 
the U.S. Constitution or a federal law.72 Over the years, low-income 
individuals have relied heavily upon Section 1983 to make real the federal 
rights that Congress has promised. Enforcement of the Social Security Act, of 
which Medicaid is part, has been no exception.73 
A. The Supreme Court’s Section 1983 Cases 
A Social Security Act case from 1980, Maine v. Thiboutot, addressed 
enforcement under Section 1983 and expressly held that “the phrase ‘and laws’ 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Respondents’ Answer to Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate at 6, Tulare Local Health 
Care Dist., 2015 WL 5260427 (No. 3:15-cv-02711-SC). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: 
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation. custom or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. . . . 
Id. Unlike in Supremacy Clause actions where attorneys’ fees are not available, plaintiffs can 
obtain attorneys’ fees if they are the “prevailing party” in a Section 1983 case. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
(2012). 
 73. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974) (“[S]uits in federal court under 
Section 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on 
the part of participating states.”) (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970)); 
Rosado, 397 U.S. at 422-23 (stating “[i]t is . . . peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less 
in the welfare field than in other areas of the law, to resolve disputes as to whether federal funds 
allocated to the States are being expended in consonance with the conditions that Congress has 
attached to their use,” and allowing Section 1983 cases to enforce provisions of the Social 
Security Act); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 317 (1968) (allowing welfare recipients to enforce 
the “reasonable promptness” provision of the Social Security Act’s welfare law pursuant to 
Section 1983); accord Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981) 
(citing King v. Smith with favor in case not involving Social Security Act and stating “where 
Congress has intended the States to fund certain entitlements as a condition of receiving federal 
funds, it has proved capable of saying so explicitly”). 
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means what it says” and, thus, Section 1983 enforcement applies not only to 
constitutional rights but also to federal laws.74 Thiboutot’s holding is simple 
and straightforward, but it did not satisfy a majority of the evolving Supreme 
Court, particularly with respect to laws enacted pursuant to the Spending 
Clause. A year after Thiboutot, the Court began to restrict private enforcement 
in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.75 Discussing the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (which was a 
Spending Clause enactment but not part of the Social Security Act), Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion likened legislation enacted pursuant to the 
Spending Clause to a contract between the federal government and the states 
with the typical remedy for state noncompliance being an action by the federal 
government to terminate funding.76 Subsequently, the Court cautioned that 
Section 1983 actions require a plaintiff to assert a violation of a federal “right,” 
not merely a violation of federal law.77 
In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, a hospital association filed suit 
under Section 1983 alleging that state officials were violating the hospitals’ 
rights under a payment provision of the Medicaid Act.78 After noting that 
Maine v. Thiboutot authorized a Section 1983 action for violations of federal 
statutes, the Court noted two exceptions to this general rule of enforcement: 
when the statute does not create individual rights within the meaning of 
Section 1983 and when Congress has foreclosed enforcement through Section 
1983 in the underlying statute itself.79 The Court then stated that the inquiry to 
determining whether a statutory provision creates a “federal right” under 
Section 1983 
turns on whether the provision in question was intend[ed] to benefit the 
putative plaintiffs . . . If so, the provision creates an enforceable right unless it 
reflects merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct rather 
than a binding obligation on the governmental unit, . . . or unless the interest 
 
 74. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 11, 12-13 (1980) (enforcing a Social Security Act 
provision). 
 75. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 1. 
 76. Id. at 17, 28; 
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: 
in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions 
. . . Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal 
moneys, it must do so unambiguously . . . In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending 
power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is 
not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal 
Government to terminate funds to the State. 
Id. 
 77. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); see also Blessing 
v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (citing Golden State Transit, 493 U.S. at 106). 
 78. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 503 (1990). 
 79. Id. at 508. 
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the plaintiff asserts is too vague and amorphous such that it is beyond the 
competence of the judiciary to enforce.80 
Applying this test, Wilder held that the Medicaid provision at issue created a 
right enforceable by hospitals under Section 1983.81 
The Supreme Court has instructed courts to use the “traditional” 
enforcement test for determining whether Congress intended a federal statute 
to create rights under Section 1983.82 Specifically, courts must ascertain 
whether “each separate claim” satisfies the test.83 The three-part enforcement 
test asks whether each of the provisions cited by the plaintiff (1) creates a right 
intended to benefit the plaintiff, (2) is written with sufficient clarify for a court 
to enforce, and (3) is mandatory on the state.84 When the three-part test is met, 
“the right is presumptively enforceable.”85 The presumption can be overcome 
only by demonstrating that Congress foreclosed private enforcement expressly 
or by creating a “comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible 
with” private enforcement.86 The Wilder Court held that Medicaid’s 
administrative process “to curtail federal funds to States whose plans are not in 
compliance with the Act [42 U.S.C. § 1396c] . . . cannot be considered 
sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a congressional intent to withdraw 
the private remedy of § 1983.”87 
In 2002, Gonzaga University v. Doe further clarified the Section 1983 
enforcement test.88 The case involved a provision of the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which is a Spending Clause enactment but 
 
 80. Id. at 509 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 81. Id. at 509-10. 
 82. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. 
 83. Id. at 342; see also Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358 n.8 (1992) (instructing that each 
federal statute “must be interpreted on its own terms”). 
 84. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509. 
 85. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 274 (2002). 
 86. Id. at 284 n.4; see also Blessing, 520 U.S. at 330, 346 (stating this is a “difficult 
showing”). The Court has found enforcement under Section 1983 foreclosed in only a few cases: 
see generally City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) (regarding 
Telecommunications Act); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (regarding Education of the 
Handicapped Act); Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981) (regarding Water Pollution Control and Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries 
Acts). 
 87. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521-22; see also City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal., 544 U.S. at 121-
22 (including Wilder and Medicaid in listing of previous cases and statutes where Section 1983 
enforcement is not foreclosed by a statutory enforcement scheme); Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 
280 (noting Wilder held Medicaid Act contains “no sufficient administrative means of enforcing 
the requirement against [states] that failed to comply”). 
 88. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 280 (Gonzaga University was represented by now Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
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not a part of the Social Security Act.89 The FERPA provision prohibited 
federal funding to any entity with a policy or practice of permitting the release 
of private records without written consent from the student or parent.90 The 
Court refused to allow a student to enforce the provision.91 Citing Pennhurst, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion held the federal law could not be enforced 
under Section 1983 because Congress had not unambiguously manifested its 
intent to confer individual rights on the plaintiff.92 Specifically, to establish a 
federal right under Section 1983, a federal law must contain “rights- or duty-
creating language” and have an individual rather than an “aggregate” focus.93 
At its heart, then, the stated Gonzaga test turns on the need to discern 
congressional intent. 
B. The Social Security Act’s Private Enforcement Provision 
In Suter v. Artist M., the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could not use 
Section 1983 to enforce a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act, which is part of the Social Security Act.94 The Suter Court further 
stated that a Social Security Act provision did not create enforceable rights if it 
was placed in a statute that listed mandatory elements of state plans submitted 
to receive federal funds.95 This part of the decision had potentially far-reaching 
ramifications because most Social Security Act titles, including Medicaid, are 
written in terms of what a state plan must include for a state to receive federal 
funds to operate the plan. Indeed, soon after Suter was decided, some courts 
began to hold that entire titles of the Social Security Act could not be 
enforced.96 
Congress reacted decisively to correct the Suter error and reestablish the 
private right of action as it existed previously in cases such as Wilder, 
Thiboutot, and Rosado. Specifically, Congress amended the Social Security 
Act to provide: 
In an action brought to enforce a provision of [the Social Security Act], such 
provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a 
section of [the Act] requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents 
 
 89. Id. at 279-80. 
 90. Id. at 276 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 280 (“We made clear [in Pennhurst] that unless Congress ‘speak[s] with a clear 
voice,’ and manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent to confer individual rights, federal funding 
provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by § 1983.” (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 n.21 (1981)). 
 93. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 285, 288. 
 94. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 350 (1992). 
 95. Id. at 358. 
 96. See, e.g., Mason v. Bradley, 789 F. Supp. 273, 277 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (refusing to allow 
plaintiff to enforce provisions of the Aid for Families with Dependent Children program). 
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of a State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for 
determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan 
requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. 
Artist M, 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court 
decisions respecting such enforceability; provided, however, that this section is 
not intended to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section 671(a)(15) of 
[the Act] is not enforceable in a private right of action.97 
The Conferees explained that: 
The intent of this provision is to assure that individuals who have been injured 
by the State’s failure to comply with the Federal mandates of the State plan 
titles of the Social Security Act are able to seek redress in federal courts to the 
extent they were able to prior to the decision in Suter v. Artist M.98 
According to the House Ways and Means Committee: 
Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court has recognized, in a substantial 
number of decisions, that beneficiaries of Federal-State programs could seek to 
enjoin State violations of Federal statutes by suing under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983. 
See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 
(1980).99 
The Committee also noted that: 
Social Security Act Program beneficiaries, parents, and advocacy groups have 
brought hundreds of successful lawsuits alleging failure of the State and/or 
locality to comply with State plan requirements of the Social Security Act . . . 
Much of this litigation has resulted in comprehensive reforms of Federal-State 
programs operated under the Social Security Act, and increased compliance 
with the mandates of the Federal statutes . . .  Suter v. Artist M. could also 
result in the dismissal of many suits brought to enforce the State plan titles of 
the Social Security Act pending on or commenced after the date of the Court’s 
decision in the case. Lower courts have already relied on the Suter v. Artist M. 
decision to dismiss lawsuits brought to enforce the program requirements 
. . . .100 
 
 97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-2, 1320a-10 (2012). In addition to enacting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-2, 
1320a-10, Congress has evidenced its intent on other occasions. For example, in 1981, 1985, 
1987, and 1996, Congress rejected bills that would have limited private enforcement under 
Section 1983. See S. 584, 97th Cong. § 1 (1981); S. 436, 99th Cong. § 1 (1985); S. 325, 100th 
Cong. § 1 (1987); H.R. 4314, 104th Cong. § 309(c) (1996). In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Court 
invited Congress to change the law if it thought the Court’s interpretation of congressional intent 
was in error. 448 U.S. 1, 8 (1980). That Congress has not done so also evidences enforcement 
rights under Section 1983. 
 98. H.R. Rep. No. 103-761, at 926 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2901, 3257. 
 99. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, H. R. DOC., NO. 102-631, at 364 (2d Sess. 
1992). 
 100. Id. at 364-65. 
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Congress provided yet further evidence of its intent when it stated: 
[W]hen the Congress places requirements in a statute, we intend for the States 
to follow them. If they fail in this, the Federal courts can order them to comply 
with the congressional mandate. For 25 years, this was the reading that the 
Supreme Court had given to our actions in Social Security Act State plan 
programs. The Suter decision represented a departure from this line of 
reasoning.101 
As is evident from the face of the statute itself, the purpose of the law is to 
“restore[ ] the right of individuals to turn to Federal courts when states fail to 
implement federal standards under the Social Security Act.”102 Thus, in 1994, 
Congress amended the Social Security Act expressly to recognize that 
provisions of the Social Security Act are not to be deemed unenforceable 
simply because they are included in a section specifying the provisions of a 
State plan; rather, courts are to decide enforcement questions by applying the 
grounds for enforcement recognized by the Supreme Court prior to 1994 (in 
cases such as Wilder and Blessing).103 
C. Medicaid Enforcement Under Section 1983 
The Supreme Court has not decided a Medicaid Section 1983 enforcement 
case since Gonzaga was decided on June 20, 2002.104 However, a number of 
lower courts have applied the Gonzaga/Blessing test in the Medicaid context. 
Of particular note are the forty-four cases filed against state Medicaid agencies 
that have been decided by the federal courts of appeals.105 This activity is 
summarized in tables and discussion, below. 
 
 101. 139 CONG. REC. S3, 173, S3, 189 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1993) (statement of Sen. Riegle). 
 102. 138 CONG. REC. S17689, S17689 (1992) (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. 
Riegle). 
 103. Social Security Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-432, § 211, 108 Stat. 4398, 
4460 (1994), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-10 (2012)). For appellate opinions citing Sections 
1320a-2, 1320a-10, see Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1112 n.26 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
“courts around the country have relied on [Section 1320a-2] in holding some Medicaid Act rights 
enforceable under § 1983 even where the statute’s ‘rights-creating’ language is embedded within 
a requirement that a state file a plan or that that plan contain specific features.”); see Watson v. 
Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2006); Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 202 
(2d Cir. 2004); S.D. v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir. 2004); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 
1002 (11th Cir. 1997). But c.f. Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1058 n.42 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(refusing enforcement of a Medicaid provision, finding Section 1320a-2 “hardly a model of 
clarity” and concluding that it does not disturb the reasoning of Pennhurst). Judge O’Scannlain’s 
Sanchez reasoning ignores the fact that Congress enacted Section 1320a-2 specifically to preserve 
the long history of private enforcement of the Social Security Act and that Pennhurst is not a 
Social Security Act case. 
 104. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2002). 
 105. See Appendix. 
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Table 1 shows where the cases have occurred. As of April 8, 2016, eleven 
of the twelve federal circuits had reviewed at least one Section 1983 Medicaid 
case since Gonzaga was decided.106 The Ninth Circuit has been the most 
active.107 The D.C. Circuit is the only appellate court not to have decided a 
Medicaid Section 1983 case.108 
Table 1 
Medicaid Section 1983 Circuit Court Cases Post Gonzaga 
June 20, 2002-April 14, 2016109 
 
1st 2d 3d 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th D.C. 
5 6 4 2 3 6 3 3 8 3 1 0 
 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s teaching, the appellate courts are 
reviewing enforceability on a provision-by-provision basis.110 Table 2 shows 
that, since Gonzaga, federal appellate courts have reviewed the enforceability 
of twenty-five Medicaid Act provisions.111 These courts have allowed just over 
half of the provisions to be privately enforced by the plaintiffs.112 The vast 
majority of the cases involve enforcement by Medicaid beneficiaries; however, 
five appellate courts (the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits) 
recognize the right of federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) to enforce 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(bb), a Medicaid provision that specifically addresses payment 
requirements for FQHCs.113 
A few Medicaid provisions have received particular attention post-
Gonzaga. Federal courts of appeals have consistently allowed Medicaid 
beneficiaries to enforce two provisions: 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), which 
requires the state Medicaid agency to provide medical assistance to “all 
individuals” with reasonable promptness,114 and Section 1396a(a)(10)(A), 
requiring the state agency to provide medical assistance to “all individuals” 
 
 106. See Table 1; see also Appendix (referencing all forty-four cases). 
 107. See e.g., Ninth Circuit court cases cited in full in the Appendix: Planned Parenthood of 
Ariz., 727 F.3d 960; Clayworth, 140 F. App’x 677; AlohaCare, 572 F.3d 740; Cal. Ass’n of Rural 
Health, 738 F.3d 1007; Spry, 487 F.3d 1272; Ball, 492 F.3d 1094; Sanchez, 416 F.3d 1051; 
Watson, 436 F.3d 1152. 
 108. See Table 1. The D.C. Circuit dismissed a Medicaid Section 1983 case as an improper 
interlocutory appeal. See generally Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia, 671 F.3d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 109. See Appendix (referencing all forty-four cases). 
 110. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997) (“Only when the complaint is broken 
down into manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies 
the various criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights.”) 
 111. See infra Table 2. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2012). 
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who are described in the section’s listing of covered populations (e.g., 
individuals with disabilities, older adults, pregnant women, low-income 
children).115 The First and Third Circuit courts have also concluded that 
Medicaid beneficiaries can enforce certain provisions contained in a part of the 
Medicaid Act, called the Nursing Home Reform Act.116 By contrast, all six of 
the federal circuits to have reviewed the question (the First, Second, Fifth, 
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits) have held the Medicaid equal access 
provision, Section 1396a(a)(30)(A), does not create an enforceable federal 
right.117 
The vast majority of appeals court cases (thirty-eight of the forty-four 
cases) focus on the first prong of the enforcement test (whether the provision in 
question unambiguously manifests congressional intent to confer individual 
rights on the plaintiff).118 The courts have reached the same conclusion when 
assessing a Medicaid provision against the first prong, and there are no splits 
among the circuits. 
The Tenth, Eighth, and Third Circuits have, however, reached different 
conclusions when applying the third prong of the enforcement test (whether 
the provision creates a binding obligation on the state).119 Their assessments 
 
 115. Id. § 1396(a)(10)(A). 
 116. See Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 524, 529 (3d Cir. 
2009) (allowing plaintiffs to enforce 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r(b)(l)(A), 1396r(b)(2)(A), 
1396r(b)(3)(A), 1396r(b)(4)(A)(iv), 1396r(b)(2)(C), 1396r(b)(3)(C)(i)(l), 1396r(b)(3)(D), 
1396r(b)(4)(A), 1396r(b)(4)(B), 1396r(b)(6)(C), and 1396r(b)(c) (2012) against county-operated 
nursing facilities, finding the provisions “replete with rights-creating language”); Rolland v. 
Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2003) (allowing plaintiffs to enforce 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r(b)(1–
3), 1396r(b)(3)(f), 1396r(b)(4)(a), 1396r(c)(1)(A, B), 1396r(e)(1, 3, 6), 1396r(e)(7)(A)(i), 
1396r(e)(7)(B)(i), 1396r(e)(7)(C, D), 1396r(e)(7)(G)(iii) (2012) in suits against staff officials). In 
an earlier case, the Second Circuit dismissed a pro-se plaintiff’s complaint, finding it 
“unintelligible and difficult to adjudicate” but including a sentence stating that “the Nursing 
Home Reform Act’s provisions do not confer a right of action on [the plaintiff] that can be 
enforced against a private nursing home. . . .” Prince v. Dicker, 29 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 
2002). Noting the non-binding nature of this case, a New York district court subsequently held 
provisions of the nursing home reform act are enforceable. See Pantalone v. Cty. of Fulton, No. 
6:10–CV–913 2011 WL 1457935, at *2-3 (discussing Prince and allowing plaintiffs to enforce 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1396r(b)(1)(A), 1396r(b)(4)(A)(i) (2012) pursuant to Section 1983). 
 117. See infra Table 2. A decision from the Eighth Circuit that allowed private enforcement 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A) (2012) based on previously controlling circuit precedent was 
vacated by the Supreme Court. See Pediatric Specialty Care v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 
F.3d 1005, 1015 (8th Cir. 2006); vacated on other grounds by Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, 
551 U.S. 1142 (2007). A decision from the Third Circuit came slightly ahead of Gonzaga, 
applying an analysis that is remarkably similar to what Gonzaga would eventually hold. See Pa. 
Pharm. Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 555 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 118. See Appendix (cases numbered one through thirty-eight). 
 119. See Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Lewis v. 
Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 333-34, 342 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Ctr. for Special Needs Tr. Admin. 
v. Olson, 676 F.3d 688, 700 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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pertain to subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4), a Medicaid provision that 
addresses eligibility when a Medicaid applicant has a trust.120 In Hobbs v. 
Zenderman, the Tenth Circuit held Section 1396p(d)(4)(A) does not impose an 
unambiguous, binding obligation on the state.121 That conclusion is based on 
an earlier Tenth Circuit case that did not discuss private enforcement under 
Section 1983 but held that Section 1396p(d)(4)(A) left the states free to decide 
whether and under what conditions to count trusts for Medicaid eligibility 
purposes.122 While acknowledging that “the statute might have been read in the 
first instance to require States to exempt special needs trusts,” Hobbs held that 
construction was foreclosed by the earlier case absent en banc reconsideration 
or a contrary decision from the Supreme Court.123 
By contrast, the other two circuits have allowed a Medicaid applicant to 
enforce other subsections of Section 1396p(d)(4).124 In Center for Special 
Needs Trust Administration v. Olson, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged Hobbs 
but pointed out that Hobbs concerned paragraph (A) while the case before it 
raised a claim under paragraph (C).125 The court declined to apply Hobbs, 
finding paragraph (C) contains the mandatory language “shall not” when 
describing the obligation imposed on the state and, thus, creates a binding 
obligation on the state.126 More recently, the Third Circuit concluded, in Lewis 
v. Alexander, that paragraph (C) imposes mandatory obligations on the state 
and can be enforced under Section 1983.127 The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in Lewis.128 
  
 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) (2012). 
 121. See Hobbs, 579 F.3d at 1179. 
 122. Id. at 1180 (citing Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Lewis, 685 F.3d at 333-34, 342; Ctr. for Special Needs Tr. Admin., 676 F.3d at 700. 
 125. Ctr. For Specials Needs Tr. Admin., 676 F.3d at 700 n.2. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Lewis, 685 F.3d 325, 333, 342; id. at 344 (acknowledging Rizzuto and Hobbs but stating, 
“[h]ere, Congress has not only provided a comprehensive system of asset-counting rules, it has 
actually legislated on this precise class of asset” and required states to exempt any trust meeting 
the provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) (2012)). 
 128. Alexander v. Lewis, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013). 
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Table 2 
Post-Gonzaga Circuit Enforcement of Medicaid Provisions 
June 20, 2002-April 14, 2016 
 
Medicaid Provision 
(42 U.S.C. § 1396) 
Held Enforceable Held Unenforceable 
a(a)(3)-fair hearing 2d (2015, 2012),129 
6th (2003)130 
 
a(a)(8)-reasonable 
promptness 
1st (2002),131  
3d (2004),132  
4th (2011, 2007),133  
5th (2013),134  
6th (2006)135 
 
a(a)(10)(A)-eligibility for 
medical assistance 
3d (2004),136  
5th (2004),137  
6th (2006),138  
7th (2012),139  
9th (2006)140  
 
a(a)(10)(B)-comparability 2d (2015)141  
a(a)(10)(C)–medically 
needy  
 10th (2009)142 
a(a)(10)(D)-mandatory 
home health services 
2d (2015)143  
 
 129. Davis v. Shah, No. 14-543-CV, 2016 WL 1138768, at *16 n.11 (2d Cir. 2016); Shakhnes 
v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 130. Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 131. Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 132. Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 133. Doe v. Kidd, 419 F. App’x 411, 415 (4th Cir. 2011), reaffirming, 501 F.3d 348, 356 (4th 
Cir. 2007). 
 134. Romano v. Greenstein, 721 F.3d 373, 379 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 135. Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 544 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 136. Sabree, 367 F.3d at 183. 
 137. S.D. ex rel. Dickinson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 607 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 138. Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 544. 
 139. Bontrager v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 140. Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 141. Davis v. Shah, No. 14-543-CV, 2016 WL 1138768, at *18 n.12 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 142. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1183 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 143. Davis, 2016 WL 1138768, at *10 n.6. 
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a(a)(10)(E)–cost-sharing 
for qualified Medicare 
beneficiaries (QMBs) 
6th (2015)144  
a(a)(13)(A)–institutional 
payment rates; notice 
process 
 2d (2006)145  
a(a)(17)-reasonable 
standards 
 8th (2006),146  
9th (2006),147  
10th (2009)148 
a(a)(18)-trusts 3d (2012)149  
a(a)(19)-best interests 
 
 2d (2015),150  
7th (2003)151 
a(a)(23)(A)-free choice of 
provider 
6th (2006),152  
7th (2012),153  
9th (2013)154 
 
a(a)(25)-third party 
liability  
 11th (2012)155 
 
 144. Wheaton v. McCarthy, 800 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 145. N.Y. Ass’n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging, Inc. v. DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147, 148 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
 146. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 147. Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 148. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1183 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 149. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 345 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 150. Backer ex rel. Freedman v. Shah, 788 F.3d 341, 344-45 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 151. Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 152. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 464-65 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 153. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 
962, 974 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 154. Planned Parenthood of Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 155. Martes v. Chief Exec. Officer of S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 683 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
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a(a)(30)(A)-provider 
payments156 
 1st (2004),157  
2d (2006),158  
5th (2007),159  
6th (2010, 2006),160 
9th (2007, 2005, 
2005),161  
10th (2007, 2006)162 
a(a)(43)-EPSDT 6th (2010, 2006)163   
a(bb)-FQHC payment 1st (2008, 2005),164  
2d (2014),165  
3d (2013),166  
4th (2007),167  
9th (2013)168 
 
b(m)-managed care  9th (2009)169 
 
 156. Soon after Gonzaga, the Eighth Circuit allowed enforcement of Section (30)(A) in a law-
of-the-case decision that was subsequently vacated. Pediatric Specialty Care v. Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, 551 
U.S. 1142 (2007). See Minn. Pharm. Ass’n v. Pawlenty, 690 F. Supp. 2d 809, 820 n.8, 820 n.9 
(D. Minn. 2010) (discussing Gonzaga, Pediatric Specialty Care, and other Eighth Circuit 
precedent and holding Section (30)(A) does not create enforceable rights under Section 1983). 
 157. Long Term Care Pharm. All. v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 158. N.Y. Ass’n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging, Inc. v. DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147, 148 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
 159. Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 160. John B. v. Goetz, 626 F.3d 356, 363 (6th Cir. 2010); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 
454 F.3d 532, 543 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 161. Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2007); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 
F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005); Clayworth v. Bonta, 140 F. App’x 677 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 162. Okla. Chapter of Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 
2007); Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens. 464 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 163. John B., 626 F.3d at 362; Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 537. In John B. v. Emkes, 710 
F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir. 2013), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court decision that held 
Sections 1396a(a)(43)(B) and (C) to be privately enforceable but not an implementing regulation. 
42 C.F.R. § 441.61(c) (2015) (requiring the state to work with other entities to implement Early 
and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) fully). 
 164. Concilio De Salud Integral De Loiza v. Pérez-Perdomo, 551 F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 2008); 
Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 165. Cmty. Health Care Ass’n of N.Y. v. Shah, 770 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 166. N.J. Primary Care Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 722 F.3d 527, 542 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 167. Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 168. Cal. Ass’n of Rural Health Ctrs. v. Douglas, 738 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 169. AlohaCare v. Haw. Dep’t of Human Servs., 572 F.3d 740, 747 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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d(a)-medical assistance 
services 
3d (2004),170  
6th (2006),171  
 
d(p)-cost-sharing for 
QMBs 
6th (2015)172  
n(c)(2)(C) 
n(d)(2)(D)-home & 
community waiver 
informing 
9th (2007)173  
p(d)(4)(A)-trust 
remainders 
 10th (2009)174 
p(d)(4)(C)–special needs 
trusts exclusion 
3d (2012),175  
8th (2012)176 
 
r-nursing home reform act 
provisions 
1st (2003),177 
3d (2009)178 
 
r-6-transitional Medicaid 2d (2004)179  
 
Finally, federal statutory provisions are the focus of the Section 1983 
inquiry. Circuit courts are consistently finding that federal regulations do not 
independently create privately enforceable rights under Section 1983.180 
However, a regulation can define or flesh out the content of a federal statute 
that is itself privately enforceable. For example, in Shakhnes v. Berlin, the 
Second Circuit held the Medicaid fair hearing statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3), 
 
 170. Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 171. Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 543 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 172. Wheaton v. McCarthy, 800 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 173. Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 174. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1183 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 175. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 176. Ctr. For Special Needs Tr. Admin. Inc. v. Olson, 676 F.3d 688, 699 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 177. Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 178. Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 532 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 179. Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 180. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) and another decision, Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), caused lower courts to revisit the question of whether federal 
regulations can independently create rights under Section 1983, and the clear trend is that they 
cannot. See, e.g., Price v. Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1112 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It is now well 
settled that regulations alone cannot create rights . . . however, that regulations ‘may be relevant 
in determining the scope of the right conferred by Congress’ and ‘therefore may be considered in 
applying the three-prong Blessing test.’”) (citation omitted); Johnson v. Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 
629 (6th Cir. 2006); S. Camden Citizens v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790 (3d Cir. 
2001); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1012 (11th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 
(4th Cir. 1987). 
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as construed by the timeframe regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(f), “creates a 
right, enforceable under § 1983, to receive a fair hearing and a fair hearing 
decision ‘[o]rdinarily, within 90 days’ of a fair hearing request.”181 
D. Armstrong and Section 1983 
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care, discussed above, expressly 
acknowledges that the case does not concern Section 1983.182 The health care 
providers in Armstrong brought their claim directly under the Supremacy 
Clause.183 Nevertheless, a few state attorneys have already sought to extend 
Armstrong to bar enforcement of Medicaid Act provisions pursuant to Section 
1983.184 So far, courts have rejected these efforts in cases where Medicaid 
beneficiaries, consistent with the traditional Section 1983 enforcement test, 
have targeted their complaints to specific Medicaid provisions.185 In the only 
appellate court decisions to date, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has 
rejected the state’s argument that Armstrong precludes enforcement of 
Medicaid provisions pursuant to Section 1983.186 
 
 181. Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 182. The Armstrong majority addressed Wilder in a footnote as follows: 
Respondents do not claim that Wilder establishes precedent for a private cause of action in 
this case. They do not assert a § 1983 action, since our later opinions plainly repudiate the 
ready implication of a § 1983 action that Wilder exemplified. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 
536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (expressly “reject[ing] the notion,” implicit in Wilder, “that our 
cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of 
action under § 1983.”). 
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1396 n.*. 
 183. Id. at 1384. 
 184. The federal government has taken the position that “many provisions of the Medicaid 
statute . . . are enforceable through individual lawsuits under § 1983.” Statement of Interest of the 
United States at 5, Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Kliebert, No. 3:15CV00565 (M.D. La. 
Aug. 31, 2015). 
 185. In Providence Pediatric Medical DayCare, Inc. v. Alaigh, a New Jersey court considered 
a complaint that cited a “litany of Medicaid statutory provisions and regulations that were 
purportedly violated by Defendants.” Providence Pediatric Med. DayCare v. Alaigh, 112 F. Supp. 
3d 234, 250 (D.N.J. 2015). The court entered judgment for the defendant on nine of the twelve 
claims because the “Plaintiffs do not even attempt to articulate, let alone meet their burden of 
demonstrating,” that they have a federal right under Section 1983. Id. at 251. Citing the part of 
Armstrong that was joined by only four justices, the court noted that the plaintiff had provided no 
authority to support the right of a medical provider, rather than a beneficiary, to assert any claims 
under the Medicaid Act. Id. (quoting Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1387). 
 186. See Davis v. Shah, No. 14-543-CV, 2016 WL 1138768 (2d Cir. 2016) (regarding 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(3), fair hearing requirement, Section 1396a(a)(10)(B), comparability 
requirement, and Section 1396a(a)(10), mandatory home health services requirement); Fishman v. 
Paolucci, 628 F. App’x 797, 798 (2d Cir. 2015) (regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3), fair hearing 
requirement); see also, e.g., Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, No. 2:15cv620, 2015 WL 
6517875, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 2015) (“Armstrong does not cast significant doubt on this 
now-well-established proposition” that the freedom of choice of provider provision, 42 U.S.C. § 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
When Congress added Medicaid to the Social Security Act in 1965, it did 
not include a private cause of action. The courts allowed private enforcement 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, to a lesser extent, the Supremacy Clause because 
they understood that individuals could obtain judicial relief when they were 
being harmed by a violation of the law. Beginning with the Rehnquist Court, 
these assumptions were undermined in cases such as Pennhusrt and Suter. In 
1994, Congress responded to the Supreme Court, enacting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-
2, 1320a-10 to ensure that beneficiaries can enforce provisions of the Social 
Security Act that create federal rights as determined by the traditional test 
announced in cases such as Wilder and Blessing.187 The Court’s most recent 
decision, Armstrong, should not disturb this unambiguous congressional intent 
because Armstrong concerned Supremacy Clause, not Section 1983, 
enforcement. 
For more than a decade, the courts of appeals have consistently applied the 
Section 1983 enforcement test in Medicaid cases. Consistent with Blessing, 
Medicaid enforcement questions are being decided on a provision-by-provision 
basis when complaints are pled in “manageable analytic bites.”188 Medicaid 
Act provisions are being assessed against all three prongs of the traditional 
enforcement test, and Medicaid beneficiaries are continuing to enforce 
provisions that speak in terms of the “individual,” using words like “must” and 
“shall.” In sum, while private enforcement of federal law has come to resemble 
the game of pin the tail on the donkey, unambiguous congressional intent and a 
strong, consistent appellate court track record of enforcement should allow 
Medicaid beneficiaries to peek from under the blindfold and obtain judicial 
relief through Section 1983 when their federal rights are being violated. 
  
 
1396a(a)(23) (2012), creates a federal right under Section 1983); Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast 
v. Kleibert, No. 3:15-cv-00565, 2015 WL 6551836 (M.D. La. Oct. 9, 2015) (holding plaintiffs 
could enforce free choice of provider provision, even after Armstrong); J.E. v. Wong, 125 F. 
Supp. 3d 1099 (D. Haw. 2015) (recognizing plaintiffs’ rights after Armstrong to enforce the 
Medicaid availability (Section (a)(10)) and child screening and treatment (Section (a)(43)) 
provisions in a case seeking coverage of behavioral health therapy services); Emma C. v. Eastin, 
No. 96–cv–04179, 2015 WL 1737672 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015) (distinguishing Armstrong as “a 
Medicaid case wherein the Court considered whether there was an implied right of action under 
the Supremacy Clause”); Fla. Pediatric Soc’y v. Dudek, No. 05-23037-CIV-
JORDAN/O’SULLIVAN, 2015 BL 130043 (S.D. Fla. April 30, 2015) (“Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 
1386 n. *, confirmed that Gonzaga sets out the appropriate standard for determining whether a 
statute creates privately enforceable rights.”) 
 187. Mark G. v. Sabol, No. 06294, slip op. at 22, 23 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998); Blessing v. 
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997). 
 188. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342. 
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